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A.   a3TechnicalTechnical Document Style9Wg  2  1.   2#Ua4TechnicalTechnical Document Style8bv{ 2  a.   a1TechnicalTechnical Document StyleF!<  ?  I.   a7TechnicalTechnical Document Style(@D i) . a8TechnicalTechnical Document Style(D a) . 2UXPleadingHeader for numbered pleading paperP@n   $] X X` hp x (#%'0*,.8135@8:*`)`) vg.28), along with the unexpurgated NRC language which carries a more precautionary message than do the EPA viewgraphs.]  <  Several of the consecutively numbered Freed viewgraphs were missing, and Freed's office promptly faxed them to me. Freed explained that he initially sent only the viewgraphs used in a particular lecture. One of the initially missing viewgraphs (No.18) listed the gasoline components of greatest importance in reducing VOCs, NOx, and Toxics. Sulphurreduction topped the list for effective emission control, and oxygenates were deemed significant for reducing toxics only. tDownstream Alternatives Inc.ă Robert E. Reynolds, President of Downstream Alternatives Inc., was a  witness before the COMMITTEE. 4<30.2 5 Subsequent to his testimony, in a document prepared by himself, 4<30.3 5 he provided the COMMITTEE with a comparison of the emission characteristics of two different fuels: PhaseI, and PhaseII California gasolines. A test report provided by Reynolds shows the PhaseII gasoline having a lower RVP, a higher initial boiling point, lower levels of olefins, aromatics, and benzene; much lower sulphur; and 11% MTBE. The PhaseI gasoline has no MTBE. 4<30.4 5 Reynolds says "the benefits of the RFG [PhaseII fuel] are unquestionable." But he presents the COMMITTEE with an apples vs. oranges argument (PhaseI vs. PhaseII gasoline); he says PhaseII gasoline has less NOx emission, but we are not told that it would probably be even less without the MTBE oxygenate; we are not told that improved automotive VOC reduction will not substantially reduce ozone in Maine; we are not told that there are many ways to formulate gasoline, and that oxygenates are not a necessary component of the mix. Reynolds' test report tells us that automobile "speed seems to have a greater effect on exhaust emissions than does fuel type" (p.3), and that PhaseII gasoline has statistically insignificant COreduction improvement over PhaseI gasoline (p.1). Once again, we are left asking the basic question: What are oxygenates doing for Maine? Reynolds' company has published Changes in Gasoline II, a guide to the use of oxygenated fuels. The publication was funded "through an educational grant from the Renewable Fuels Foundation". 4<31.1 5 According to the Washington DC office of the Renewable Fuels Association, the Foundation is part of the Association operation in Washington. 4<31.2 5@?*`)`)  Enhanced Automobile Inspection for Portland Area, or Statewide, by 1999ă During January 1997, the EPA was still meeting with Maine "stakeholders"  (the Emission Testing Advisory Group (ETAG)), to establish some form of enhanced automobile inspection procedures for the Portland area. 4<31.3 5 Negotiations proceeded under a newly modified EPA rule that would allow urban areas of greater than 100,000 population to adopt automobile emission inspection procedures simpler than previously required, that could be conducted at local, as well as more centralized, facilities. 4<31.4 5 MDEP is considering such possibilities, both for Portland, and for use statewide. 4<31.5 5 On January 13, 1997, MDEP polled ETAG stakeholders for their choices of an emissions testing procedure for Portland and for statewide use. Stakeholders failed to reach consensus. 4<31.5.1 5 The modified federal rule became effective on September 23, 1996. It is a significant improvement over the requirement for centralized hightech facilities. Maine citizens should be pleased that their hard work to defeat that poorly conceived program in Maine bore fruit. The new modified rule for Portland and similar urban areas is evidence of the effectiveness of people who stood up to state governments and to the EPA and just said "No"! However, the COMMITTEE should be aware: (1) of the language of the new rule that encourages adoption of emissioncontrol measures that go beyond the modified rule: "EPA does not necessarily recommend implementing this particular program but rather encourages states to design a program that will achieve equal or greater emission reductions than the performance standard while providing for the specific needs of the area." (2) of EPA's defense of scientificallyindefensible measures that go beyond the rule namely I/M CARTEST. (3) of EPA willingness to initiate sanctions against Maine to enforce scientificallyindefensible provisions of the Clean Air Act. 4<31.6 5 (4) of EPA intransigence on CARTEST in the face of mounting evidence that it doesn't work. (The following section on the Coninx Reports is particularly relevant on this point.) (5) that MDEP wishes to disband the ETAG stakeholders group because there is no consensus among members to support a specific automobile testing proposal for either the Portland area or for statewide implementation. Though MDEP seems intent on testing automobiles for emission reduction capability, it is unwilling or unable to produce evidence that its automobiletesting proposals will be measurably effective at reducing the target pollution ozone. On January 21, 1997 I was informed that MDEP is considering private contractors to provide advice on handling the current impasse namely, how to justify imposition of new automobile testing programs in Maine. I wrote to Commissioner Sullivan asking if what I have been told is true. 4<31.8 5 He responded: "I believe you misunderstood the Department's intention" and that "The Department ... intended as a first step in a public education process to'@*`)`) conduct certain market research studies to survey the level of public knowledge. This information would assist in the development of whatever approach is chosen to address the requirement for an auto testing program. Since the Department (MDEP) has neither the expertise nor the resources to conduct such research in house, the Department will request grant money from the EPA to assist in the hiring of an outside contractor to accomplish this task". 4<31.8.1 5 This is not atypical of statements from MDEP management. As to whether MDEP will develop scientific justification for a possible statewide automobile emissions testing program, Sullivan responded, "Whether the program musters a scientific justification will depend on the type of program implemented". 4<31.8.2 5 On February 27, 1997 the Augusta Capital Weekly announced, "Emission tests on the comeback". MDEP Air Quality Bureau Chief James Brooks is quoted as saying MDEP would like to have an emissions testing program "up and running by 1999" and that "it will be up to the Legislature to choose an option and flesh out the details." 4<31.8.3 5 On June 6, 1997 the USEPA notified the governors of New Hampshire and Maine with threats of federal sanctions unless Maine and New Hampshire implement EPAapproved cartest programs. <31.8.4 On October 17, 1997, New Hampshire Governor Jeanne Shaheen notified the EPA that New Hampshire "will file suit to require the agency to take action against air pollution entering New Hampshire from other states." <31.8.5 X Coninx Reports, GAO Report, and RAND Studyă Montreal writer Paul Coninx has studied automobileemissions Xtesting in the United States and Canada with particular attention to the role of the United States EPA and its advocacy for such testing. In his report, Specific Scientific and Technical Issues Relating to the Effectiveness of I/M Programs, 4<31.9 5 Coninx speaks of the Maine I/M (Inspection and Maintenance) program called CARTEST (now repealed), and finds that "less than 16% of the total cost of the I/M program was spent actually repairing vehicles." (Sec. 5, p.3)    "Using the data supplied by Maine and EPA estimates, the cost/benefit ratios of the Maine biennial IM240 program have been calculated. Our analysis of the reallife data from the Maine IM240 program using typical EPA analytic methods yielded a cost per tonne of HC reduction at 80 times what the EPA and I/M supporters repeatedly claim. The cost per tonne of HC for later model cars is over 130 times what EPA claims". (Sec. 5, p.2)    I cannot overemphasize the particular relevance of the Coninx work to that of the COMMITTEE. For it is not only officials in the executive branch of Maine's Government who have used questionable science to sell the public on the "benefits" of CARTEST and oxygenated RFG. The federal EPA is the national architect of this promotion; and Coninx exposes the EPA's free and easy defense of I/M programs: 'A*`)`)Ԍ  Й"[Coninx] requested and received every technical report that appeared to address the issue of the effectiveness of I/M in reducing vehicle emissions dating back to the 1970s. ... After careful analysis, the writer found that every one of the EPA studies suffered from one or more serious methodological flaws, including arbitrary and biased sample selection, unwarranted assumptions, improper statistical references, small sample sizes, lack of proper controls, lack of peer review, and the drawing of absurd conclusions. Also reviewed were reports done by private contractors which often relied heavily on EPA computer models and contained the same methodological flaws. ... While making every reasonable attempt to find scientific evidence showing I/M to be effective, the writer found none. No peerreviewed or other credible scientific studies could be found in support of the claims of I/M supporters. The writer did, however, come across a small but growing body of genuine, peerreviewed and published scientific work on I/M. That material shows I/M to have little or no positive effect on the environment." (p.45, Foreword)    With regard to NOx emissions and automobileemission inspection plans for Maine, 4<32.1 5 the Coninx message should be taken seriously. Coninx says:    "There is reason to suspect that many I/M programs, if they have any effect at all, may actually be doing the environment more harm than good, at least in areas where ozone is a problem. This is because many of the simple adjustments often used in I/M, such as resetting the fuel mixture to pass I/M HC and CO emissions tests, tend to make NOx emissions worse." (Sec. 2, p.1)    To an extent, this serious shortcoming of EPA airpollution "science" may be a consequence of using computer "models", rather than real measurements to study the world around us. In my opinion, the EPA approaches to I/M and to the use of oxygenated fuels in Maine have the same, identical, common flaw namely that to attempt to control ozone in Maine through predicted, modest reductions in VOCs, whether through the use of I/M or of RFG, is not justifiable or credible in terms of current scientific thinking. Coninx sums it up:    "Bad science begets bad programs, and throwing good money at a bad program, no matter how well intentioned its supporters may be, will not benefit the environment. ... The Mobile Sources branch of the EPA appears to rely more on the force of U.S. federal law to promote I/M than on science and evolving technology." (Executive Summary, p.3 & p.1)    In November, 1996, Coninx published a second report that addresses specifically the British Columbia I/M program, "AirCare". 4<32.2 5 Coninx finds: * AirCare's own calculations show pollutionreduction effectiveness for both HC and NOx to be only 27% of target. * Testing of automobiles less than eight years old uncovers little pollution'B*`)`) and is thus relatively unimportant. * 16% of vehicles that fail the I/M test are given waivers to continue polluting. * 1/3 of AirCarecertified repaired cars cannot pass the retest. 69% of retests found at least one emission increase; 23% two increases; and 7% increases in all three (CO, HC, and NOx)! * "No scientific evidence that AirCare has provided any significant environmental benefit to British Columbia air quality. Real environmental benefits can only be assured if antipollution programs are based on sound science, not on the vested interests of a small group of "stakeholders"." Regarding EPA's I/MCARTEST regulations, the 1992 U.S. General Accounting Office Report5 concluded that although they "could have a major impact on reducing air pollution from motor vehicles, ...there are too many issues that have yet to be resolved. These issues include whether (1) emission failures are being properly identified by the IM240 (I/MCARTEST) test, (2) emission failures can be properly repaired, (3) motorists will be unnecessarily inconvenienced and frustrated, and (4) alternative procedures exist that are less costly but could provide similar emissions benefit." <32.3 Among the conclusions of a 1993 RAND Study are: "We believe that neither the California Air Resources Board nor USEPA nor anyone else has both the framework and the appropriate empirical data to assure that the models are sufficiently accurate and unbiased to define or perhaps even to guide policy. ...Presumably, it would be worthwhile to require that the basis for regulatory decisionmaking should conform to good scientific practice ...". 4<32.4 5 "Another RAND finding is that even the adoption of the USEPA centralized IM240 concept (CARTEST) is not predicted (by EPA) to go very far in improving total fleet emissions, in terms of the gap between newer lowmileage vehicles and the inuse fleet." 4<32.5 5 The 1996 Coninx reports confirm the above, and in themselves are a devastating blow to any real hope for I/MCARTEST as an effective airpollution reduction program. Yet CARTESTI/M programs are still in vogue at the EPA. For example, citizens are currently organizing to oppose an I/M Program for Kansas City, 4<32.6 5 and contractors are waiting in the wings hoping to profit from administering such a program. The nation's largest I/M program contractor, the Envirotest Systems Corporation, "hired the bestconnected lobbyists, built coalitions with business and health organizations, took over competitors", bought the Systems Control Company which ran Maine's erstwhile CARTEST program,5 and has emerged "well positioned ... as the leader in the centralized emissions testing industry". 4<32.7 5 'C*`)`)Ԍ <!Pollution Credit Tradingă A particularly meanspirited scheme to blame pollution on consumers rather  than on industry is to enroll consumers in a plan wherein consumers generate "pollution credits" that can then be turned over to an industrial polluter. The industry, in turn, deposits its credits into a pollutioncredit "bank" which issues, to that industry, permits to increase pollution by an amount corresponding to its existing pollutioncredit balance. Testmarketed in Maine in 1994, this was not a popular idea. "Credits" generated by citizens whose automobiles passed the Statemandated automobile emissions test were to be converted into pollution permits for the LouisianaPacific Corp. in Aroostook County. 4<32.7.1 5 Though the 1994 carowner/LouisianaPacific pollution trade did not capture the fancy of a majority of incoming Governor King's otherwise enthusiastic pollutioncredit trading "stakeholders", credit trading has been kept alive by allowing a credittopollute to be sold by an industry that pollutes less to one that may wish to pollute more. 4<32.7.2 5    "Pollution credits" have seemed like odd creations ever since they were born in 1990. A company that's less filthy than the law allows need not wait for heavenly recompense it can sell its virtuous deed right here on earth, a license for filth that can be snapped up by some less fastidious outfit." <32.7.3    On January 25, 1995 it was reported: "Minnesota Power is selling off most of its Wall Street portfolio to buy ($162 million) Indiana based ADESA Auto Auction, North America's third largest used auto seller with annual revenues of $7.7 million." <32.7.4 Is it unreasonable to speculate on whether MP will be selling used vehicles, or instead, scrap hundreds of thousands to generate "Emission Reduction Credits" for marketing to other power companies and stationary industrial polluters?5 For a Duluthbased diversified electric company to put all its eggs in one basket, going into the used car business may be cause for concern. Scrappage programs are meeting significant opposition from auto hobbyists, restorers and aftermarket parts and service industries, providing 2.5 million fulltime jobs in a $200 billion industry". <32.7.5 The ADESA purchase was reported to be completed in August of 1996. <32.7.5.1 People should be aware that autocrushing plans are already popular with bureaucrats around the Country. Called "cash for clunkers", once again citizens are pressured to generate "pollution credits" by turning in oldermodel cars to be crushed. The "credits" thus generated are purchased and resold to businesses in need of pollution permits. In this way, pollutioncredit trading has become a profitable business for the EcoScrap Company of Los Angeles (formerly Unocal) where it's more profitable to crush cars (10,000 per year anticipated) than to implement ridesharing programs. 4<32.7.6 5 So the consumer takes a licking, the pollutioncredit vendors profit, and the newcar dealers and carfinance companies just grin and bear it. Watch that this scam'D*`)`) does not take hold in Maine! It's so simple a chain of unconscionable profiteering initiated by the simple act of talking people out of their affordable transportation so they have to buy new cars they can't afford. On July 24, 1997, Communities for a Better Environment filed a complaint with the EPA and lawsuits against five oil companies accusing the industry of:  ` ` "swapping pollution credits in order to avoid installing equipment that would keep hazardous fumes out of minority neighborhoods. The federal civil rights suit attacks a program that allows the companies to buy and scrap highpolluting cars in exchange for not having to deal with emissions that escape when gasoline is loaded onto ships" <32.7.7  ` `    6$Governor Angus King  The Chief Executive's response in the current controversy over RFG has been to leave the responsibility to "stakeholders", task forces, and other bodies such as the COMMITTEE. Predictably, lobbyists went to work and befriended the popular excuse for capitulation to the oxyfuel industry: namely that the EPA will assess Federal penalties if the State fails to accept the oil industry solution to ozone oxygenated, reformulated gasoline (RFG). 4<32.8 5 On June 28, 1995, MDEP Air Quality Bureau Chief John Davis made a viewgraph presentation of "Governor King's Volatile Organic Compound Reduction Strategy" to the Maine Board of Environmental Protection. 4<32.10 5 Viewgraph #2 showed the mobilehighway contribution to York, Cumberland, and Sagadahoc County total VOCs to be 50%; official MDEP Inventory figures called it 14%. <32.11 Viewgraph #3 claimed King's VOCreduction program would "Provide Clean Air" and a "Healthy Economy". Viewgraph #8 claimed "no cancer link" to MTBE, and that "MTBE replaces 24% benzene". Viewgraph #11 proclaimed: "No 15% Plan = No Jobs", and "Economy crippled". 4<32.12 5 Such an aggressive promotion of MTBE could leave one eager to try it on breakfast cereal. When running for Governor, Angus King prepared a memorandum for George Neavoll, an editor at the Portland Press Herald. It was a simplified, but analytic, explanation of the diminishing returns to be expected from trying to reduce ozone through a system of automobile emissionstesting and repair. 4<32.13 5 Following his election, Governor King endorsed a different plan to reduce ozone, 4<32.14 5 the effectiveness of which was no greater than that of the automobiletesting program he had opposed. The new plan did not test automobiles; it fed automobiles oxygenated RFG instead. Subsequently I have mailed and hand carried much ozonepollution information to Governor King's office, but I do not know if it has ever reached him. 4<32.15 5 On May 1, 1995, King responded to a newspaper editorial that asked why he didn't recommend the sale of (reformulated gasoline) statewide. King said, "Under the Clean Air Act, the State is prohibited from selling reformulated gas in areas that are in compliance with federal pollution laws ...". 4<33.1 5 'E*`)`)Ԍ What King may have intended to say was that, under Federal law, he could not require the sale of RFG statewide. 4<33.2 5 But oxygenated RFG is apparently already being sold in areas of the State where it is not required at a cost of "6 to 8 cents a gallon higher than conventional gasoline". 4<33.3 5 It's good business for the oxygenated fuel industry; it's not so clear what benefit Maine residents get from this "deal". Another disturbing aspect of the Administration's record on air pollution is its advocacy for obtaining an EPA waiver to allow NOx emissions from new industrial development in northern Maine without the otherwise required NOxreduction technology. 4<33.4 5 On one hand, Governor King recommends ineffective VOCreduction to control ozone; on the other hand he advocates allowing NOx increases where NOx is the recognized ozoneproducing culprit in NOxlimited areas like Maine. 4<33.5 5 The Governor must be judged on his record of performance which, at this time, appears to have been to enlist the aid of the Health Bureau and the Department of Environmental Protection, that (on unreasonably short notice) took information from the oxygenated fuels industry and its lobbyists, and repackaged it for consumption by the taxpaying public. 4<33.6 5 This "science" is the kind Governor King employed in two other recent efforts one to develop with public money an industrial facility to benefit private interests the other to develop with public money a campaign to discredit a citizen referendum. 4<33.7 5 In these efforts, King enlisted the services of public agencies to develop scientific arguments that would support preconceived political conclusions. 4<33.8 5 In the case of oxygenated RFG, poor science justified spending public money to benefit private industrial interests to ceremonially place the burden of cleaning up industrially polluted air on the backs of individual citizens. The oxyfuels industry is only one of a number of large industrial and corporate interests that seem to avoid close scrutiny under the King Administration. Not unlike using oxygenated fuel to "reduce ozone" in Maine, the NYNEX/E911 emergencycommunicationnetwork contract recently rejected by a State appeals board 4<33.9 5 is an example of government irregularity that may benefit industry more than the public which pays the bill. In Governor King's defense, he says he's willing to go after outofstate air polluters who drop their products on Maine. 4<33.10 5 King says, "Midwestern states should be forced to curb emissions that cause pollution in the Northeast". 4<33.11 5 I agree. Time will tell whether King will take the legal action New Hampshire Governor Shaheen has pledged. <33.12  SECTION VI EPA Strategy: Divide and Conquer The Coninx Reports, as well as experiences of citizen activists, have found  that the EPA often lacks scientific integrity when it comes to dealing with air and water pollution, dealing with industry that pollutes, and dealing with industry that may wish to profit from cleaning up that pollution.'F*`)`)Ԍ EPA management does not enjoy, and has not earned, the confidence of many thoughtful Americans who have met the EPA on various environmental battlefields. The EPA has trouble distinguishing the concept of public service from that of loyalty to corporate America. As with the FBI's long history of harassing political activists, 4<33.13 5 the EPA frustrates environmental and health activists who oppose incineration and other EPA procedures for disposing of dangerous chemicals. 4<34.1 5 An example of how closely the EPA is tied to industrial interests interests it should be regulating is a letter dated April 2, 1977 from EPA employee William Sanjour to EPA Administrator Carol Browner. He notified her of a "serious breech of government ethical standards" committed by EPA officials. Sanjour said, "an EPA employee was sent [in 1996] to Amsterdam at public expense to attend a conference on dioxin at which he presented an industrysponsored study which downplayed the need for EPA regulation of that industry ...and which concluded that there was no connection between the chlorine content of the wastes in incinerators and the dioxin emissions. The study was paid for by the Vinyl Institute, a trade association whose members have a very strong vested interest in showing that the incineration of polyvinyl chloride (PVC) and other chlorinated products do not emit significant amounts of dioxin when incinerated so as to avoid regulation by EPA." <34.1.1 Three months after Sanjour sent his letter, there was still no response. <34.1.2 On September 5, 1997, I filed a Freedom Of Information (FOI) request with the EPA for a copy of its response to Sanjour. The law requires federal agencies to respond to FOIs within 20 working days. As of November 5, 1997, I had received no answer to my request. Often against citizen opposition, the EPA promotes the disposal of sewage sludge on agricultural land. 4<34.2 5 And as we already know, the EPA supports the use of CARTEST and oxygenated fuel to "lower ozone pollution" in Maine efforts that serve mainly to enrich corporate America. EPA has yet to reveal how effective (or ineffective) these programs are at lowering ozone pollution in Maine. An organization that has been particularly helpful in focussing public attention on health and environmental hazards in the United States is The Citizens Clearinghouse for Hazardous Waste (CCHW). Lois Marie Gibbs, who led the campaign that exposed Hooker Chemical Company (Occidental Petroleum) at Love Canal, is Executive Director of CCHW. She and CCHW Organizing Director Charlotte Brody have published, "Divide and Conquer: The EPA's Latest Strategy and What to Do About It", 4<34.3 5 an uptodate guide on how the EPA subverts grassroots democracy in America. It explains how government tactics isolate community leaders from their constituencies by first appointing them to stakeholder panels, and then with the decisionmaking process thus restricted to a group of officials, their decoys, and a few outvoted community leaders, business as usual can proceed. Unpopular decisions will then be blamed on the community leaders who, after all, were part of the secret decisionmaking process. Distrust of community leaders is thus established, and vital community unity is destroyed. Gibbs'G*`)`) and Brody advise how to thwart such tactics and how to maintain community unity so important when facing faceless giants like the EPA. CCHW has published a summary of facts on MTBE, along with information on grassroots contacts for help with questions about it. 4<34.3.1 5 In the current issue of CCHW's journal Everyone's Backyard CCHW Science Director Stephen Lester analyzes EPA's dedication to citing an incinerator in a Liverpool, Ohio neighborhood. Lester says:    "...risk assessment is NOT used to reach decisions, but to justify them; science is a pawn used to achieve a political agenda; and the EPA will protect corporate interests rather than protecting public health." <34.3.2    Just as the EPA uses "specialinterest science" to justify higher profits for the MTBE industry, rather than to protect the public health. But once in a while, in spite of the EPA, the environment gets a break as it did on July 7, 1997 when "the 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the EPA's March 1996 regulation, allowing the importation of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) for destruction in U.S. incinerators, violated the Toxic Substances Act." <34.4 SECTION VII The Clean Air Act, and The Presidential/Congressional Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management In the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, Congress mandated that a Commission on Risk Assessment and Risk Management be formed to "...make a full investigation of the policy implications and appropriate uses of risk assessment and risk management in regulatory programs under various Federal laws to prevent cancer and other chronic human health effects which may result from exposure to hazardous substances." 4<34.4.1 5 Volume I of the Commission Report recommends "an integrated, holistic approach to solving public health and environmental problems... and [establishment of] a process for engaging stakeholders ... who might be affected by the risk management decision". This study recognizes that the environment suffers when risks, particularly cumulative risks, are ignored and that the involvement of stakeholders, as well as stakeholder expertise, should be expanded. <34.4.2 Unfortunately, the publication of the longoverdue observations and the valuable recommendations of the report's authors are all but obscured by patriarchal philosophy in which the Report frames the authors' good advice. Though its recommendations for expanded citizen involvement are refreshingly appropriate, the Report suggests limiting citizen involvement to subservient roles in which meaningful citizen challenge to authority is minimized. For example, under a section entitled Guidelines for Stakeholder Involvement, the very first introductory statement assumes that there will be "nonnegotiable items" on which stakeholder input will not be entertained. 'H*`)`) This statement is followed by a patronizing caveat: "stakeholders must be willing to negotiate and should be flexible". 4<34.4.3 5 The final introductory statement makes clear the need to limit stakeholder involvement to that "appropriate to the scope and impact of a decision and the potential of the decision to generate controversy". 4<34.4.4 5 Under the heading Who Decides?, the Report carefully delineates stakeholder influence by suggesting "incorporating their [stakeholder] recommendations where possible". 4<34.4.5 5 And finally, in a section dealing with riskmanagement actions, an inventory of recommended citizen actions is presented: "Recycling, purchasing products that use recycled materials, or complying with automobile emissions testing". 4<34.4.6 5 [underlining, JCH] The Report presents two examples of controversial Maine government actions. 4<34.4.7 5 One was Maine's illfated CARTEST program, and the other is the Maine Turnpike widening battle. The Report is wide of the mark on both issues. In the case of CARTEST, it maintains that the reportedly "cost effective" CARTEST program failed because the government failed to properly indoctrinate the public. The Report missed two reasons that CARTEST failed before it even started: (1) that the scientific basis for CARTEST's environmental effectiveness was faulty; and (2) that CARTEST just didn't work. Regarding widening of the Maine Turnpike, the Commission apparently considers the currently raging battle an example of "successful" stakeholder involvement. <34.4.8 The Commission does not mention that the reason citizens got involved originally was because they were forced to petition the turnpike question onto the ballot not because the State Government involved the public, but because the government did not involve the public. Only after the voters (not "stakeholders") defeated the turnpike widening in 1991 did the State momentarily lower its proTurnpikewidening profile. But the State could not abide its defeat at the polls; the Legislature placed the turnpikewidening question back on the ballot for another try in November 1997 where it won. In its haste to find a "successful" stakeholder operation in Maine, the Commission On Environmental Risk Assessment failed to note an important environmental success of the earlier turnpike referendum lowering the potential increase of air pollution from a widened Turnpike. In spite of the Report's shortcomings, the MDEP should carefully review it. As is, it is still a better basis for public policy than MDEP's current tunnelvision regarding citizen (stakeholder) involvement in the environmentalprotection process. The MDEP would do well to start with the Commission Report, and repair its shortcomings on stakeholder participation. Maine citizens do not need another venture into expensive, ineffective, hitech, environmental experiments like CARTEST and oxygenated gasoline. $I*`)`) xSECTION VIII UPDATE An early version of Dirty Air, Dirty Water was presented to the COMMITTEE in March, 1997.